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WHAT IS REPUBLICANISM?

BY PROF. CALVIN THOMAS.

THE following considerations have developed slowly out of much reflexion upon the contents of *The Open Court* for January 16—a memorable number of the paper. As I read Mr. Conway's hot philippic I felt that his heat was carrying him too far; while the calm argument of Professor Cope in defence of the new Americanism seemed to me to proceed, here and there, upon a faulty analysis of the facts. On turning to the editor's article I found remarks which were excellent in their way but were not occupied with the precise phase of the Venezuelan controversy which had all along seemed to me the most important. For in my mind the vital question takes this form: Should we be acting in the interest of republican institutions if we were to go to war with Great Britain over a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana? It appears to be clear enough that the Monroe Doctrine had in it from the first a touch of political idealism; that is, while intended primarily as a measure of self-preservation, it was also intended to safeguard the interests of republican government in the New World generally. In the time of the Holy Alliance, which was everywhere fighting democracy, it was possible, perhaps even natural, to think that the two aims were ultimately one, or, in other words, that the smaller necessitated the larger. To-day, however, we are really concerned only with the idealistic aspect of the Doctrine. For surely no man in his senses can now pretend to believe that the safety of the powerful American Union, already bounded on the north by a British domain larger than its own, depends upon the exact position of a boundary-line in the tropical forests of South America. Whatever loyalty we feel toward the Monroe Doctrine, if it is not to be mere fetish-worship, must be simply the loyalty we feel toward republicanism. Hence the vital importance of the question whether we should be likely to promote the interests of republicanism, either in the world at large or in the New World particularly, if we were to let the pending controversy involve us in a war with Great Britain.

To answer this question properly would require more space than *The Open Court* might wish to give

to the subject, and would be a task for a writer with other qualifications than mine. My present purpose is much simpler, being merely to call attention to the importance of a right statement of the question with which public opinion has to deal. This I think I can do best by commenting briefly upon the argument of Professor Cope; for I have no doubt that Professor Cope represents, not perhaps in every sentence and in every minor conclusion, but in the general drift of his reasoning, views which are now held by a majority of the American people. It thus becomes a question of momentous public interest whether his reasoning is correct.

The gist of Professor Cope's contention is as follows: We Americans believe for good reason that a republican form of government is better than any other, and it is only natural and right that we should wish to protect the interests and extend the sphere of that which we believe to be best. But we can do nothing in Europe. There are irreconcilable antipathies between the monarchical systems of the Old World and the republicanism which we represent. The European monarchies are our natural enemies; they hate us and would destroy us if they could. On the other hand the South American Spaniards are our natural friends and allies. Republicanism is already established in that continent, and while still in a somewhat turbulent state, is full of promise for the future. Let us therefore join hands with the South American republics, protect them at any cost against monarchical interference and thus save the Western hemisphere at any rate for republican institutions.

Now the first question suggested to the mind by such an argument is that which heads this article. Professor Cope writes all along as if republicanism, or a "republican form of government," were something simple, definite, and capable of easy isolation in thought and practice. But this is evidently not so. There have been and there still are republics of many kinds. Take, for example, that of Aristides, of Cato, of medieval Venice; and then add modern France, Switzerland, the United States, the Transvaal. Here are seven republican governments differing from one another radically in "form," that is, in political methods and institutions. What is the common feature of

them all that constitutes the essential nature and the saving virtue of republicanism? What is, so to speak, the substance of the "form"? What is it that we are to hold dear and to fight for? Is it any particular name for the chief executive? Do we swear, for example, by the word "president"? Or is it the elective character of the chief magistrate without regard to his tenure of office, the degree of discretionary power vested in him, or the character of the electorate. Is the thing we want any particular kind of suffrage law or mode of representation? Is it a bicameral parliament? Surely we are not going to insist upon our own "form" for the Western hemisphere rather than that of France or Switzerland. We *must* regard much as unessential to the republican form. What then are the unessentials and what are the essentials?

I hope no one will think that I am here raising idle academic questions to befog a matter that is clear enough for practical purposes. It is precisely for the practical purposes of politics that the matter is not clear enough, and is in need of sharp definition. To illustrate: So long as it is a question for missionary reports, statistical tables, and map-making, we can well enough regard every form of nominally Christian missionary enterprise in Asia—whether Catholic or Protestant or Greek, Methodist or Baptist or Unitarian—as coming under the head of the propagation of Christianity. But suppose we were asked to risk a great war for the purpose of saving Asia to Christianity: Should we not begin to ask at once, Whose Christianity? What do you mean by Christianity?

Instead of attempting a close definition of the thing he holds dear, Professor Cope opens the important part of his discussion with generalities, which, as it strikes me, do not help us very much. He thinks it a "general truth" that "any form of government is good if administered with due regard to human rights, and that any form if administered without regard to those rights is bad." He then goes on to say that "Americans are generally of the opinion that a republican form is better than any other, because it contains within itself the conditions for an administration more in accordance with human right than any other, and is therefore more likely to be so administered." This seems to imply that for Professor Cope, as for Alexander Pope in the eighteenth century, good government is all a matter of administration. No suggestion that the character and sanction of the laws to be administered are an important element of the problem. So, too, the goodness of the republican form in particular is a matter of "administration in accordance with human rights." No hint that it has anything to do with the rights of the people to determine for themselves what their laws shall be and who

shall administer them. But passing by this point for the present, I wish to raise the question: What are "human rights"? Who can tell in an abstract and general way? We can tell perhaps, or, rather, good lawyers and learned judges can tell, often with great difficulty, what rights a particular people, say the American, the English, or the German, have claimed for themselves and have by hook or crook managed to get recognised in public law. But who can tell what human rights are apart from history and evolution? What are the rights of a man dropped alone for life on an uninhabited island in the sea? Or what are the mutual rights of twenty persons placed in similar circumstances without a common language or any common traditions? A large number of Americans think they have a right to a fifty-cent dollar, to an eight-hour day for work, to employment on their own terms. Are these human rights? If not, why not? Who is to be the judge? I do not forget that the Fathers, in the grandiose rhetoric born of the revolutionary spirit, did specify "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" as "inalienable rights" with which man is endowed by the Creator. I recognise, too, that the phrase "human rights," or "rights of man," has done good service in the language of poetry and eloquence on behalf of political liberty. But after all, speaking soberly, what government has ever recognised any such inalienable rights? Do we not alienate them quickly in case of a murderer, if we can get hold of him? Did we not make short work of them with our conscription-laws during the late war? Can we get very far in any practical discussion with such a concept of "human rights"? Must we not come down very soon to legal rights?

It occurs to me as possible that Professor Cope may really have had in mind legal rights, perhaps the elementary rights of person and property; and that he may have meant to contend simply that republicanism offers the best guaranty for the safety of these rights from illegal encroachment on the part of executive or administrative authority. If this be his meaning, the question is certainly a fair one for debate, but it must be answered in the light of experience; theories on the subject are of no use. We should have to inquire, for example, whether, under the laws of each country, an American is in less danger of having his life, liberty, or property taken from him through official usurpation, than is, say an Englishman, or a German. This is a question for lawyers. But if one who is not a lawyer may venture to give the impression he has derived from observation and reading, I should say that all three countries are very much on a par in this respect, and that in all three the particular danger referred to is now so insignificant as to be hardly worth bothering about in a discussion of this kind. Personal

tyranny, assuming to rule without law, or in defiance of law, is not much of a dragon where there is constitutional government. Even in Russia his manners have been improved by the general growth of democracy; so that now when he eats people, he is at least anxious to have it understood that he acts from disinterested motives.

Professor Cope observes that "the gist of the objections to the European systems of government is that they are, excepting that of France, much too largely administered by and on behalf of privileged persons and classes, and not sufficiently on behalf of the people." Here it must be remarked that unless one wishes to charge extensive usurpation, this is an objection to the laws themselves. But if it be meant that the laws are bad, then the question at once arises: Who is the best judge as to whether a people has good laws properly administered? Now I have always supposed the distinctive character and the saving grace of republicanism to lie in the answer which it gives to this question, its answer being: the people themselves. In other words, I have supposed that the heart of republicanism is simply democracy—the rule of the people. But by "the people" we have no right to understand either the very poor or the very rich alone; neither workingmen, nor employers, neither farmers, nor merchants, nor manufacturers alone; not even what Mr. Lincoln called the "plain people." "The people" includes everybody. And since, in the conflict of opinions and interests, the people in this sense cannot *all* have their way, republicanism (or democracy) means for practical purposes the rule of the majority under the forms of law. It means that "the people," thus defined, shall have such laws as they like and have them administered by persons who are acceptable. And this, to my mind, tells the whole story. If any country has popular sovereignty in its legislature (that is, a house of elected representatives whose will cannot be permanently blocked by persons that are not elected), and if it has also an administration that is in one way or another responsible to the people and ready to obey the people,—such country has the heart of republicanism, has all of republicanism that is worth fighting for. These are the matters of faith; other things are matters of opinion amongst republicans themselves.

If this be correct, and I think I am not alone in supposing it to be so, we see at once how confusing and unscientific it is to speak indiscriminately of "the European systems of government with the exception of France." Why not except Switzerland also? And why put Russia and Germany and Great Britain on the same plane? Must we not make distinctions on every hand? May not a "monarchy" have more or less of republicanism, and a "republic" more or less

of monarchy? The antithesis of "monarchy" today is not "republicanism," but "absolutism"; for the monarchy may be "limited" and the limitation may be greater or less. It may have proceeded so far, as is actually the case in England, that the monarch, in his official capacity, is simply the organ-voice of the people.

But to return to Professor Cope's "gist of the objections," which was in a word—"privileged classes." Does this refer to industrial classes—manufacturers, for example—that manage to get legislation in their interest? If so, how about the exception of France? And is not our own home made of glass? Or does it mean the workingmen, the farmers? If so, Germany has gone farther than any other country in legislation intended for their special benefit. Nowhere is the "welfare of the people" made more prominent as the touchstone of legislation than in Germany. Can we Americans cry "paternalism" from one corner of the mouth and "indifference to the people" from the other? Or does Professor Cope mean the titled aristocrats? If so, what privileges do they enjoy except such as are either purchasable for money in any part of the world, or else are purely social in their nature and hence outside the sphere of government. If they steal, or forge notes, or commit an assault, are they not arrested and tried by public law? Can they burn your house or enslave your person with impunity? They live in big houses and have yachts and private cars; and so do we, if we can afford it. They have the "privilege" of being lionised in society, stared at in public places and written up in the newspapers; so have our own millionaires if their taste runs in that direction. Sometimes by virtue of their wealth and position they get offices to which their merit would not entitle them; just so with us. Some of them are men of character, ability, generosity and devotion to public duty, others are profligate, dull, selfish, and useless; very much the same at home. Take away the hereditary titles and allow a little time for the nimbus to vanish and where is the very great difference? Shall we then hate them for their titles? Well I have my democratic prejudices on that subject too, but I have learned to be calm. King means tribesman; duke, leader; and count, companion; and why should we not be able, in this age of the world, to look as serenely at a constitutional duke as at a Kentucky colonel, and see in both cases nothing but the man? Professor Cope complains of the notorious social "stratigraphy of the Englishman's mind." But have we not *our* social stratigraphy? Have republics anywhere got rid of the spirit of caste? Have the South American Spaniards got rid of it? Have we? Are we getting rid of it? Is it not a matter beyond the control of government and inseparable from dif-

ferences of wealth, education, employment, and taste? Even if the socialist *régime* were realised, would not birds of a feather still flock together and entertain their private opinion of the plumage and intelligence of other flocks?

But the aristocrats have large incomes, out of proportion to their "utility," and these incomes are "stolen" from the people. Professor Cope thinks it a distinguishing mark of American speech that we call "a spade a spade and stealing we call stealing." "In Europe," he continues, "the robberies of the most enterprising robbers have been legitimised and have become a part of the system under which the people live. Thus have arisen established royal families, nobilities, and churches." But is this really a scientific nomenclature? In what sense is the Prince of Wales or the Archbishop of Canterbury a robber? Suppose that an intelligent people familiar with history and with the arguments pro and con, and having full power to get what they want and get rid of what they do not want, deliberately prefer that the personage who represents to the general eye the dignity and authority of the State shall bear the historic title of king or duke, rather than that of archon, consul, or president,—can we quarrel with them in the name of republicanism? Is it not the essence of our beloved doctrine that the people shall have what they want? And suppose they want a State Church, or having one prefer to let it stand,—can we forbid them that luxury in the name of republicanism? We have a public life-saving service; why should not the English have a soul-saving service—if *they want it*? We may think them benighted, not alive to their own true interest; but then they may think the same of us for maintaining a protective tariff, or a weather-bureau, or a fish-hatchery. It is a world in which opinions differ, and it was to make such a world habitable in peace that republicanism—the rule of the majority under the forms of law—was invented. But if a people want a king, or a crown prince, or an archbishop, is not the question of his "utility" and his income their business and no one else's? How much ought a king or a duke to receive? Or a president, a judge, a school-master? Who can tell better in each case than the people that foot the bills? Can we justly apply the name "robber" to the man who, in a law-governed country, is the legal beneficiary of his country's laws and institutions? Many people think that every protected manufacturer is a robber; others think the same of every capitalist, or of the man who holds real estate for a rise in value. But is the name correctly applied in their cases? If so, where are we to stop? Why is not anybody a robber who happens to have land or other property which somebody else thinks is more than enough?

How much land or money or salary may a man have before he begins to be a robber? We cannot evade the logic: If the Prince of Wales or the Archbishop of Canterbury is a robber, then we are all robbers who dwell on the hither side of communism. Why then use an opprobrious name and claim for it the merit of truthful plain-speaking? To my mind that is not calling a spade a spade, but it is calling a spade a bowie-knife or a burglar's jimmy.

And then, as to the contention that the European monarchies hate us and would destroy us if they could,—where is the evidence of this? It is true that after Waterloo a number of absolute monarchs, imagining that democracy meant a continuation of the revolutionary and Napoleonic era, that is, turbulence and aggressive war, set their faces sternly against it, and drew upon themselves the memorable and patriotic warning-notice of President Monroe. But they soon saw that they were battling against the ocean, and that the only way to deal with democracy was to embrace it. The soul of the Revolution went marching on, and to-day, in the form of constitutionalism, democracy has leavened the whole lump in Western Europe, captured Australia and the bulk of Africa, and made large inroads in Asia. Why should not we republicans possess our souls in peace, glad to see the stars in their courses fight our battle, and even getting a measure of solemn amusement, now and then, as we see the "monarchs" tumble over each other in their race for the favor of the dear people. I doubt if there is a king in the world at the present time who feels himself the less secure because of the existence of republics. They have learned to rely upon the honest monarchical sentiment of their subjects. Why did not Bismarck refuse to evacuate Paris unless the French put in another king? Witness the present cordial relations between Russia and France, and between Russia and the United States. Consider the solicitude of Wilhelm II. for the independence of the Transvaal. Look at Switzerland—safe and solid as her Alps, and universally respected. And not the least factor in her safety and the respect she enjoys is her habit of attending pretty closely to her own business.

To me it is the most incomprehensible proposition in the world that Europe is our natural enemy and South America our natural friend. Does the mere fact that the governments south of us call themselves republics, though many of them have yet to learn the A B C of republicanism, viz., peaceable acceptance of the will of the majority,—does this one fact count for more than all the ties of blood, of common language, traditions, laws, literature, religion, of commercial, intellectual, and artistic intercourse, that bind us to Europe? It seems to me that every nation in the

world is our natural friend, but pre-eminently the nations of Germanic Europe.

If I were despatching this article from a German city to an ordinary newspaper at home, I should confidently expect in these days that many a reader would drop it unfinished with the remark: Another American professor corrupted by residence in Europe. Better stay there if he likes it so well!—From the clientage of *The Open Court* I do not so much fear this funny martyrdom; and yet it may be well enough to say that I have not been debauched by "monarchy." I am sound on the form, am not a British sympathiser, and have had no money from the Cobden Club. And I am coming back. So far as this article is concerned, I have tried to write in a perfectly dispassionate and scientific temper, solely in the interest of truth. Underneath that, however, I have really written out of the deep love I bear my country. It is precisely because I am so good a democrat, because I have such loyal pride in my country, that I cannot bear to think of its going wrong,—confounding shadows with substance and names with things. I hate to hear my countrymen, in and out of responsible office, talking as if they had been asleep since the Congress of Vienna. It makes one feel as if they might next propose to make the Armenian atrocities the occasion of an American crusade for the capture of Jerusalem. I admit that I have not any of the time believed the danger of war to be very great. But until the Commission reports, the danger cannot be said to be altogether past. So long as this is the case, and so long as highly intelligent men can take the view which Professor Cope takes of American duty and destiny, it is pertinent to ask coldly and calmly just what we should gain for republican institutions in the Western hemisphere if we went to war with Great Britain. Assume the fullest measure of success on our part which any imagination can dream of.

The net result in South America could hardly be more than that a few thousand Englishmen, nursed in the traditions of democracy, would be compelled to leave their homes or else to submit to an offensive pseudo-republican government. We should of course be obliged by the logic of war to invade Canada, a friendly country that has done us no wrong and has no interest in the Venezuelan boundary; a country inhabited by a people as free and as democratic as we are. I assume that if we were in earnest and united, the Canadians could not stand up against us. We should then fill their land with havoc and mourning, capture their cities, subvert their institutions, excite throughout half a continent a universal and inextinguishable hatred of ourselves and of our flag, and thus acquire a territory which would be ungovernable under our system. We should have to govern it by

military despotism. And all this we should be doing in order to promote the interests of republican institutions in the Western hemisphere; doing in the name of the doctrine which asserts the right of every people to manage its own affairs in its own way. Could the arch-enemy of mankind, who is also, as we believe, the arch-enemy of republicanism, imagine in his wildest flight of cynicism a worse adaptation of means to ends?

THE INFLUENCE OF ANCIENT GREECE UPON CHRISTIAN DEMONOLOGY.

THE exchange of thought that took place among the nations of the Roman Empire produced the need of a new religion which found its satisfaction in that great spiritual movement which is known by the name of Christianity. The idea of immortality became more and more accepted by the masses of the people; but there were many to whom it was no welcome news, for it served only to enhance the fears of man's fate after death. The Egyptians' dread of judgment in the nether world, the Jews' horror of Gehenna, the Hindus' longing for an escape from future sufferings, were now added to the Greek notions of Hades, and rendered them more terrible than before. The descriptions of Tartarus which we find in Homer's *Iliad* and in Hesiod's *Theogony* began to be believed in more seriously than ever. Plato's dualistic conception of the soul created in the hearts of many noble men a longing for death as a release from the ills that in this material existence flesh is heir to, but intensified, at the same time, in others the expectations of the sufferings beyond. These tendencies were criticised by philosophers and ridiculed by witty authors. Thus we read in the *Epigrams* of Callimachus (No. xxiv):

"Cléombrot,¹ he of Ambracia, took leave of the sun in the heavens:
Leapt from a wall in the hope | sooner to reach the Beyond;
Not that he e'er had encountered an ill that made life to him
hateful;

Only because he had read | Plato's grand book on the soul."²

And Lucian tells the story of Peregrinus, surnamed Proteus, who after various adventures became a convert to Christianity. He would have been forgotten and his name would never have been mentioned in history but for the fact that in the presence of a great crowd at the Olympian festivals he burned himself to death on a big pile of wood. These were symptoms which illustrated the religious zeal of the people and characterised the unrest of the times. Further Plutarch tells us in his *Morals* that the superstitious are chas-

¹ Cleombrotus may have been the same disciple of Socrates who is mentioned in *Phaedo* II, p. 59, c. This strange case of suicide is alluded to by St. Augustine in *de Civ. Dei*, I, 22.

² Translated in the original metre.

tised by "their own imagination of an anguish that will never cease." He says:

"Wide open stand the deep gates of the Hades that they fable, and there stretches a vista of rivers of fire and Stygian cliffs; and all is canopied with a darkness full of fantasies, of spectres threatening us with terrible fables and uttering pitiful cries."

Mr. F. C. Conybeare, in his *Monuments of Early Christianity*, says, concerning the belief in hell:

"We make a mistake if we think that this awful shadow was not cast across the human mind long before the birth of Christianity. On the contrary, it is a survival from the most primitive stage of our intellectual and moral development. The mysteries of the old Greek and Roman worlds were intended as modes of propitiation and atonement, by which to escape from those all-besetting terrors, and Jesus, the Messiah, was the last and the best of the *ἡγούμενοι θεοὶ* of the redeeming gods. In the dread of death and in the belief in the eternal fire of hell, which pervaded men's minds, a few philosophers excepted, Christianity had a *point d'appui*, without availing itself of which it would not have made a single step towards the conquest of men's minds."

When the myths of the West were compared with the religions of the East, the ancient pagan beliefs were not abandoned, but transformed. Hesiod tells us in the Theogony of the terrible struggle between Zeus and the Titans, and St. Peter, when speaking in his second letter of the revolution of the angels that sinned, says that "God sent them down to Tartarus." The expression however is obliterated in the version of King James, for the word *ταρταρώσας* (having hurled them to Tartarus) is translated "sent them down to hell."

Further we read in the Theogony of the battle between the monster Typhoeus and Zeus:

"When Zeus had driven the Titans out from Heaven, huge Earth bare her youngest-born son, Typhoeus, . . . whose hands, indeed, are fit for deeds on account of their strength. . . . On his shoulders there were one hundred heads of a serpent, of a fierce dragon, playing with dusky tongues. From the eyes in his wondrous heads fire struggled beneath the brows. From his terrible mouths voices were sending forth every kind of sound ineffable,—the bellowing of a bull, the roar of a lion, the barking of whelps, and the hiss of a serpent. The huge monster would have reigned over mortals unless the sire of gods and men had quickly observed him. Harshly he thundered, and heavily and terribly the earth re-echoed around. Beneath Jove's immortal feet vast Olympus trembled, and the earth groaned. Heaven and sea were boiling. Pluto trembled, monarch of the dead. The Titans in Tartarus trembled also, but Jove smote Typhoeus and scorched all the wondrous heads of the terrible monster. When at last the monster was quelled, smitten with blows, it fell down lame, and Zeus hurled him into wide Tartarus."

This description reminds us of passages in the New Testament. We read, for instance, in Revelation, xii., 7-9:

"And there was war in Heaven. Michael and his angels fought against the dragon; and the dragon fought and his angels; and prevailed not; neither was their place found any more in Heaven. And the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent

called the Devil and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world; he was cast out into the earth, and his angels were cast out with him."

Thus the old Greek demons merely changed names and reappeared in new personalities. In this shape they were embodied into the canonical books of the New Testament and became the integral part of the new religion, which at that time began to conquer the world.

P. C.

FABLES FROM THE NEW ÆSOP.

BY HUDOR GENONE.

The Potentate's Present.

A POOR widow chanced to find opportunity to do a potentate a favor. The potentate, overjoyed to be relieved of his dilemma (which was only a small matter of a pin wanting to his sarraband) told the poor widow to name what reward she desired. The woman after a moment's reflexion said that above all else in the world she desired a canary-bird. "For," said she, "I had one that died and I miss its carolling sorely."

"Say no more," exclaimed the potentate, "I will see that your desires are more than amply gratified."

The next day His Majesty's prime minister was called into the serene presence and directed to procure forthwith and take to the widow, not a canary-bird, but an elephant.

At which all the courtiers made obeisance and cried with one voice that of all monarchs that potentate was the most amiable and generous.

But if they thought him possessed of these excellent traits it was more than the poor widow did. "For what," said she, "shall I do with so big a beast? Will I hang him in a cage in my front room? Will he sing to me and chirp and carol?"

Just then the elephant trumpeted loudly.

"There!" said the prime minister. "If it is a song you desire, what could exceed that for noise?"

"Alas! kind sir," said the widow piteously, her eyes full of tears, "it may be, and I am sure is a very fair quality of noise, but it is not the kind of noise I admire. I chanced to do my lord a trifling service which might have been repaid with a 'thank ye kindly,' but he chose to offer me a choice of gifts and I asked a bird. It is not bulk I want but beauty, and not noise but a song. So take your beast and be gone."

Then the prime minister and all the courtiers and after (when the tale was told him) the potentate said, "what base ingratitude thus to reject so great a reward."

But the widow was pleased enough to be rid of the beast, and said to a neighbor of hers that if this was generosity from thenceforth she should beware how she furnished pins for a potentate's sarraband, how great soever his extremity might be.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ARE WE RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR FATE?

To the Editor of the Open Court:

To say that my "view of God is in Christian dogmatology," is not a refutation of my argument in regard to the responsibility of God. Neither is the presentation of your idea of God's responsibility a true and logical defence of your position which teaches that "we are all builders of our own fate, and we must be our own saviours." It is incumbent upon you to show by corroborative testimony that mankind have full control of every factor in the combinations which control their actions for weal or woe, and that all human action is due solely to individual effort, environments having no power over organisms to conquer them. You must prove that sober, honest, industrious men never have to face poverty; that energetic business men who start in with courage, hope, and zeal, and a fair amount of capital, never become bankrupt; that people who do the best they can to conform to the rules of health never get sick; that passengers both on sea and land who suffer loss of life and property, always sow to their own disaster, that they are not the helpless victims of the carelessness of others who are in charge; that people who get burned to death in hotels and other buildings always start the fire which consumes them; that when a father, mother, son, or daughter commits a crime or is brought to shame, no other member of the family suffers; that when politicians work hard for office, they never get defeated; that slaves place themselves in bondage; that young men who study hard to qualify themselves to obtain lucrative positions, always get them; that all mankind have the necessary ability, which godlike sowers and reapers ought to have, to foresee and foreknow and to change the combination of the circumstances which often lord it over them; that mankind always have moral courage to refuse to be led astray; that kindness never reaps imposition, that the virtuous are always happy and the vicious are always miserable; that a farmer controls every factor in the combination which will bring him a good harvest; that every business and workman is not dependent upon other factors than themselves for success; that man is never defeated in getting anything that he wishes and strives for; that each political party can, at the same time, elect its own president; that when two nations are at war both can be victorious by force of arms. I might still go on enumerating in like manner from the facts of the domain in which we live and move. What are the empty assumptions of the teachers of religions against this great array of indisputable, scientific evidence?

Your position implies that all mankind have full knowledge and control of every natural law, or cause; that they are the primary drivers, not the driven. You view mankind the same as if you were to see a lot of spinning and weaving-machines at work and then say that they are self-acting. You look at the stream, but you neglect to take the source into consideration. You destroy the connecting link between God and man, when by pure science it can be clearly shown that the power which evolves cannot be separated from the form evolved; neither can there be any progress, or evolution unless there is involution from the primary source—the foundation-stone which has been rejected by all philosophers of a negative type. Your position implies, also, that mankind are a lot of self-imposed idiots and imbeciles, who desire misery instead of happiness, sickness instead of health, poverty instead of wealth, ignorance instead of wisdom, and evil instead of good. If I looked upon poor, suffering humanity as the cause of all their evil and suffering, I would despair of their deliverance, because like can only beget like, but as I know that the heaven of evolution within them is able to lift them up from sin and suffering, I rejoice with exceeding great joy.

There will not be a new Christianity, because Christianity is not science. New types must have new names. A whale cannot be consistently called a mollusk. All religions are transient superstitions. The parables of the mustard-seed and the leaven were not spoken in reference to Christianity,—a formulation of the apostles—but to the kingdom of God. The Gospel of Jesus is not Christianity. This will be proved later. The time has come to make a divide. As *The Open Court* is set for progress, and truth for authority, it has nothing to lose, but much to gain—as Mr. Hegeler has said, "the truth is sure to prevail."

"Man, every single individual, and also the whole of mankind, is a part of God." This is true as regards matter; but it is not true in regard to power, ingenuity, form, godhood, and infinity. Man is not identical with God. Man cannot reverse the order of his being nor the order of his growth, career, or destiny. Cannot raise himself up after he has returned to dust. God can do all these. We are not responsible because we are identical with God, but because we must be so held for the good of all. All the lower animals are so held. We are obliged to punish them if they transgress. Punishment is not retributive justice as religions teach, but an apposition of nature. Vicious organisms need restraining, just as fish need water to swim in. If the dogma of sow and reap were true, the good ought not suffer. But they do suffer just as much as criminals do, only in other forms. My position is not dualistic because I claim that forms are not altogether identical with God. It is purely monistic. Forceful matter (not force and matter) is able to combine and evolve all the forms that we see. God is simply forceful matter. As the chameleon can change its hue, yet the hues are not identical with the chameleon as regards power, knowledge, form, and control, so God is lord in all his works—all forms and conditions being subject to him.

Reasoning from the primary source of forms, God cannot be otherwise. Our true relation to God is the same as that of mill-machinery to the engine which drives it, with the exception that the engine did not evolve and arrange the machinery. Where God's evolution is not, all the efforts on the part of mankind for progress are vain. Though hand join with hand, as the labor reformers have done, human efforts cannot go ahead of natural evolution. We are not here to mix the cups which we have to drink; we have to drink the cups which the Father mixes for us. The humble attitude of the Nazarene is the true one for us to assume.

JOHN MADDOCK.

[We publish Mr. Maddock's letter without entering into the various problems which he touches upon, for there is no need of refuting them. We agree with many of his statements and feel obliged only to present an explanation of what we mean when we say that we are responsible for our fate.]

What are we? We, i. e., every one of us, are an organism of a definite character with peculiar dispositions and impulses. This idea of ourselves, however, is an abstraction, as much so as all ideas are abstractions; for we do not and cannot exist in isolation.

When we speak of our planet, earth, we must not forget that it belongs to the sun, and that the character of the earth, the gravity of its masses, its vegetation and animal life, depend upon the sun, and the sun in all its peculiarities is a determinant factor and an important part of the suchness of the earth. Were we to make an inventory of ourselves, we should find that we had to refer to the whole world of which we are a part. And when we ask the question, Whence do we come and whither do we fare? we can trace the influences that shaped us in the conditions of our life—in our parents and in the evolution of thought that preceded us; we are the continuance of prior life, and if you ask, where is that prior life? the answer cannot be that it disappeared into nothing, but "Here it is; it is we."

Our life began with the origin of life on earth; nay, it began with the origin of our solar system, and even with the origin of the Milky Way of which our solar system is a part. The impulse that animated the rotation of the nebula from which sun and earth were differentiated, continues in our life, not as the sole feature of our being, but as one that was there from the beginning, or rather from eternity. We were present when the solar system was framed, and we have no right to complain about it if it does not please us; we have a right to repent, and the desire may originate that we should undo what we did in former existences; but we have to bear all the consequences. Throughout the evolution of life we continued existence under definite conditions. It is of no account whether or not parents are conscious of the responsibility of extending their existence in new generations; they are held responsible; and the new generation reaps what the old one sowed by its deeds.

He who ventures out on the sea on a poor craft that cannot stand the storm is responsible if the storm actually comes. That we take our chances in almost all the walks of life, which in innumerable cases turn out well, does not relieve us of the responsibilities when running risks.

In this sense we are responsible for our fates and reap the fruits of our deeds; and in making this statement, I am aware of the fact, not only that we frequently are the helpless victims of the conditions under which we choose to continue in the course of life, but also that thoughtlessness or ignorance prevents us from recognising the consequences of our deeds. Every birth involves a death; while every evil deed and every error are the seeds of misery. This helplessness, in extraordinary cases, imposes the duty of assistance upon others. The solidarity of the interests of life implies that, for our own sake, we must help one another.

I grant that if by "ourselves" we understand our existence cut loose from its pre-existence, as something that rose into being from nothing and will again disappear into nothing, we may regard ourselves as a fortuitous product of circumstances, and are irresponsible in every respect.—Ed.]

NOTES.

Swami Vivekananda has written a booklet of eight chapters (fifty-four pages) on the *Karma Yoga*, which is published by Brentano (31 Union Square, New York) for \$1.00. Other lectures on the Vedānta philosophy and other subjects, such as "The Hindu Conception of God," "The Ideal of Universal Religion," "The Cosmos," and "Bhakti Yoga," can be had for ten cents per copy.

We are in receipt of a three-volume work on the life of the Rt. Rev. Ogino Dokuon by the Rev. Zitsuzen Ashitsu, the same who three years ago visited Chicago as a member of the Parliament of Religions and a representative of the Tendai sect. The book before us is written in Chinese and prefaced in Japanese. It is a tribute of Mr. Ashitsu's to his teacher, who played a very important part in the later religious history of Japan.

The Rt. Rev. Ogino Dokuon was born at the village of Yamasaka, Kojima-Gōri, of the province of Bizen in Japan in July, 1819. At thirteen he became a Buddhist monk and studied the Chinese classics under Hoashi Banri; at twenty-three he went to Kyoto and renewed his study of the doctrines of the Dharmā sect under the guidance of the head abbot, Taisetsu, of the monastery of Shōkokuji in Kyoto, and, after finishing his religious studies, he dwelt in the same monastery. During the fifty years of his religious life he was one of the most indefatigable and diligent workers for his religion. At the time of the great revolution in 1863 there arose in Japan a severe repudiation of Buddhism, and the people mercilessly attacked the Buddhist monks. The Rev. Ogino had bravely met his opponents and at last he was able to reinstate the fallen power of his religion. In 1872 he was ap-

pointed president of the Daikyōin and became the archbishop. He died on the 10th of August, 1895, at the age of seventy-six. This is only an outline of his life; a minute description of the same will be found in the Rev. Mr. Ashitsu's "Tai-Ko-Go-Roku."

We are also in receipt of another book by the Rev. Zitsuzen Ashitsu, on "the real body (or personality) of Amitabha," in which the nature of omnipresent and eternal Buddhahood is discussed.

On the platform of the Religious Parliament the Rev. Ashitsu was distinguished not only by his appearance in a tasteful robe, but also and mainly by his thoughtful face; and the readers of *The Monist* will remember his article, "The Fundamental Teachings of Buddhism," in Vol. IV., No. 2, of *The Monist*.

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